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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA 
FORT MYERS DIVISION 
 
E-VENTURES WORLDWIDE, LLC, 
9045 Strada Stell Court, 
Suite 103,  Naples, Fl 
34109, 
 
  Plaintiff, 
 
v. Case No: 2:14-cv-646-FtM-29CM 
 
GOOGLE, INC., 1600 
Amphitheatre Parkway, 
Mountain View, CA  94043, 
 
 Defendant. 
 
  
OPINION AND ORDER 
This matter comes before the Court on review of defendant 
Google's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint 
and Supporting Memorandum of Law (Doc. #78) filed on November 16, 
2015.  Plaintiff filed an Opposition to Google's Motion to Dismiss 
Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint (Doc. #79) on November 30, 
2015, to which Google filed a Reply Memorandum in Support of its 
Motion to Dismiss (Doc. #82) on December 14, 2015. 
I. 
Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint alleges the following 
facts:  Plaintiff e-ventures Worldwide, LLC is an online publishing 
and research firm that reviews products and services in specific 
industries.  (Doc. #75, ¶ 9.)  The majority of plaintiff’s revenues 
are derived from the “search engine optimization” or “SEO” 
industry.  (Id. ¶ 13.)  Search engine optimization is the process 
of causing websites to be ranked and displayed more prominently in 
search results, without payment being made to the search engine.  
(Id.)  
Defendant Google operates an Internet search engine and has 
been called “the world’s largest media company” with approximately 
70% of the United States’ online search market and 90% of Europe’s 
online search market.  (Id. ¶ 10.)  The majority of Google’s 
revenues are derived from its “AdWords” advertising program, 
through which consumers pay to have their websites ranked and 
prominently displayed in Google’s search results.  (Id. ¶ 11.)  
Links to the advertisers’ websites are displayed at the top of 
Google’s search results and each time a consumer clicks on one of 
the advertisements, Google charges the advertiser and makes a 
profit.  (Id. ¶ 12.)  Due to Google’s large market share, SEO 
companies tend to focus on how their clients’ websites can obtain 
a higher ranking on Google’s unpaid search results.  (Id. ¶ 14.)   
Plaintiff alleges that the SEO services it provides and 
advertises on its website reduce Google’s revenues because if 
companies are successful in achieving website prominence on 
Google’s unpaid search listing, then there is less of a desire for 
them to purchase Google’s AdWords advertising services.  (Id. ¶ 
15.)  Accordingly, marketing dollars that may otherwise have been 
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spent on Google advertising are spent by companies on SEO providers 
to increase their prominence on Google’s search results.  (Id. ¶ 
16.)  Both Google and e-ventures publish information online to 
assist third parties in achieving increased website visibility on 
Google.  (Id. ¶ 17.)  Google hopes that third parties pay Google 
to be ranked higher in Google’s search results, and e-ventures 
hopes that third parties pay an SEO provider, instead of Google, 
to achieve the same result.  (Id.)  Plaintiff alleges that as a 
result, Google has an anti-competitive, economic motivation to 
eliminate the visibility of e-ventures’ websites on its search 
engine results.  (Id. ¶ 18.)   
Plaintiff further alleges that prior to September 2014, e-
ventures had not made any significant or sudden changes to its 
website content that would have prompted Google to treat e-
ventures’ websites differently than they had been treated in the 
past. (Id. ¶ 19.)  E-ventures obtained information indicating that 
on or about September 15, 2014, a third party with a personal 
vendetta against e-ventures caused Google to receive false 
information regarding e-ventures’ websites. (Id. ¶ 20.)  On 
September 19, 2014, e-ventures was notified by Google that 231 
websites owned by e-ventures were being manually removed by Google 
from all of Google’s search results because they had been 
identified as “pure spam.”  (Id. ¶ 21.)  “Pure spam” is a term 
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coined and defined by Google.1  “Pure Spam” is defined by Google 
as indicating that “Google has detected that some of your pages 
may be using techniques that are outside [Google’s] Webmaster 
Guidelines.  The site appears to use aggressive spam techniques 
such as automatically generated gibberish, cloaking, scraping 
content from other websites, and/or other repeated or egregious 
violations of Google’s quality guidelines.”  (Doc. #78-1, p. 14.)  
When Google detects pages that it deems as “Pure Spam,” it 
“applie[s] a manual spam action to the affected portion of [the] 
site.”  (Id.)  The 231 websites that were manually removed by 
Google included almost every website owned by e-ventures, 
including “corporate” websites, brand new websites, and websites 
that could not have engaged in any activities which could possibly 
be classified as spam.  (Doc. #75, ¶ 23.)  Over time, 365 websites 
1 When ruling on a 12(b)(6) motion, “a judge generally may 
not consider materials outside of the four corners of a complaint 
without first converting the motion to dismiss into a motion for 
summary judgment.” Pouyeh v. Bascom Palmer Eye Inst., 613 F. App’x 
802, 808 (11th Cir. 2015) (citing Day v. Taylor, 400 F.3d 1272, 
1275-76 (11th Cir. 2005)).  “However, a document outside the four 
corners of the complaint may still be considered if it is central 
to the plaintiff’s claims and is undisputed in terms of 
authenticity.”  Maxcess, Inc. v. Lucent Techs., Inc., 433 F.3d 
1337, 1340 n.3 (11th Cir. 2005) (citing Horsley v. Feldt, 304 F.3d 
1125, 1134 (11th Cir. 2002)).  Here, the provisions referenced 
from Google’s Webmaster Guidelines were attached to defendant’s 
motion to dismiss, are central to plaintiff’s claims, and their 
authenticity has not been disputed.  Accordingly, the Court may 
properly consider them in ruling on defendant’s Motion to Dismiss. 
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of e-ventures’ websites were removed from Google’s search results. 
(Id. ¶ 57.)  
As a result of Google’s removal of e-ventures’ websites, e-
ventures’ websites could not be located on Google.com, the world’s 
most widely used search engine. (Id. ¶ 24.)  Therefore, when an 
individual would search for e-ventures on Google, a display of 
third party websites for companies using the trademark ‘eventures’ 
would appear, but not e-ventures’ actual corporate website.  (Id. 
¶ 25.)  As a result, e-ventures’ business partners and current and 
prospective business customers were prevented from locating e-
ventures’ websites through Google.  (Id. ¶ 26.)  During the ban, 
e-ventures attempted to have new websites listed in Google’s search 
results, and those websites were rejected based upon their 
affiliation with e-ventures.  (Id. ¶ 27.)  E-ventures’ websites 
were not only removed from Google.com’s search results, but were 
also removed from all google-affiliated websites and from third 
party websites participating in Google’s advertising program.  
(Id. ¶ 28.)  Plaintiff alleges that Google’s ban of its websites 
caused it irreparable harm and significant damage to its business.  
(Id. ¶ 29.)   
Following Google’s notification to e-ventures that its 
websites had been de-listed, e-ventures began researching possible 
bases for Google’s removal of its websites, without success.  (Id. 
¶ 30.)  E-ventures alleges that it made every possible change to 
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its websites in order to get the websites re-listed, but they 
remained banned.  (Id.)  Google’s removal of its websites appeared 
to be because Google determined each website was affiliated with 
e-ventures.  (Id. ¶ 31.)  Many of the websites had nothing in 
common with each other, other than their relation to e-ventures.  
(Id.)  E-ventures did not have knowledge of any specific problems 
that would cause Google to remove its websites.  (Id. ¶ 32.)   
Prior to filing suit, e-ventures attempted to address with 
Google the reasons for Google’s designation of its websites as 
“pure spam,” made significant changes to its websites, filed 
multiple resubmission requests, created new websites, and sent 
letters to Google from counsel, all to no avail.  (Id. ¶ 33.)  It 
was not until after plaintiff filed the underlying lawsuit that 
its websites were relisted on Google’s search results.  (Id. ¶ 
35.)   
Google’s search results are largely the result of algorithms 
and Google alleges that it only removes content from its search 
results in very limited circumstances.  (Id. ¶ 36.)  These limited 
circumstances are identified in Google’s published “Removal 
Policies.”  (Id.)  Plaintiff alleges that nowhere in the Removal 
Policies does Google indicate that it will ban a website owner or 
take punitive action against a website owner by removing from its 
paid and unpaid search results every website affiliated or 
associated with the website owner.  (Id. ¶ 37.)  The Removal 
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Policies likewise do not indicate that Google will remove content 
for anti-competitive reasons.  (Id. ¶ 38.)  Plaintiff alleges that 
Google’s Removal Policies do inform the public that Google takes 
a neutral approach and only removes very specific categories of 
content.  (Id. ¶ 39.)   
Plaintiff alleges that the following statements made by 
Google on its website are false, deceptive, and misleading:   
• “Google’s index merely reflects that the page 
exists on the wider web.”  
• “Google search results are a reflection of the 
content publicly available on the web.” 
• “See our Removal Policies to learn more about what 
information Google will remove.” 
• “This page explains our policies for different 
types of content that Google will remove from web, 
image or video results.”  
• Google’s “mission is to ‘organize the world’s 
information.’”  
• “Google is committed to leading the industry in 
transparency” and publishes data that “sheds light 
on how laws and policies affect Internet users and 
flow of information online.” 
• “Chilling Effects posts and analyzes copyright 
removal requests (among other types of content 
removal requests) from a number of participating 
companies on its website.  We link in our search 
results to the requests published by Chilling 
Effects in place of removed content when we are 
able to do so legally.”  
• “It is Google’s policy not to censor search 
results.  However, in response to local laws, 
regulations, or policies, we may do so.  When we 
remove search results for these reasons, we display 
a notice on our search results page.  Please note:  
For some older removals (before March 2005), we may 
not show a notice at this time.”  
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(See id. ¶ 46.)  E-ventures alleges that Google delisted the 
websites solely based upon the websites’ affiliation with e-
ventures, which did not fall within any of Google’s listed reasons 
that it would remove a website from its search results. (Id. ¶ 
48.) 
 E-ventures alleges that Google never accused it of publishing 
content in violation of Google’s Removal Policies nor of “spam.”  
(Id. ¶¶ 51-52.)  Google accused e-ventures of improperly having 
its website ranked higher in Google’s search results, 
characterizing the conduct as egregious “pure spam.”  (Id. ¶ 53.)  
The Federal Trade Commission officials concluded in a 2012 
investigation that Google used anti-competitive tactics in 
connection with its Internet search results and abused its monopoly 
power in ways that harmed Internet users and rivals.  (Id. ¶ 54.)  
Google has a history of targeting website owners who advertise or 
promote SEO services by characterizing their websites as “pure 
spam” and removing them from Google’s search results (id. ¶ 60), 
which it does for anti-competitive reasons, (id. ¶ 62).  
Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint2 alleges the following 
claims against Google:  (1) Unfair Competition Under the Lanham 
2 Plaintiff filed its initial Complaint (Doc. #1) on November 
4, 2014, which was subsequently amended twice, resulting in the 
Second Amended Complaint (Doc. #75) being the operative pleading 
before the Court.  
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Act; (2) violation of the Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade 
Practices Act; (3) Defamation; and (4) Tortious Interference with 
Business Relationships.  (Doc. #75.)  The individual counts will 
be discussed in greater detail below. 
II. 
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), a Complaint 
must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing 
that the pleader is entitled to relief.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).  
This obligation “requires more than labels and conclusions, and a 
formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not 
do.”  Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)(citation 
omitted).  To survive dismissal, the factual allegations must be 
“plausible” and “must be enough to raise a right to relief above 
the speculative level.”  Id. at 555.  See also Edwards v. Prime 
Inc., 602 F.3d 1276, 1291 (11th Cir. 2010).  This requires “more 
than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me 
accusation.”  Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)(citations 
omitted). 
In deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the Court must 
accept all factual allegations in a complaint as true and take 
them in the light most favorable to plaintiff, Erickson v. Pardus, 
551 U.S. 89 (2007), but “[l]egal conclusions without adequate 
factual support are entitled to no assumption of truth,”  Mamani 
v. Berzain, 654 F.3d 1148, 1153 (11th Cir. 2011)(citations 
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omitted).  “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of 
action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” 
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.  “Factual allegations that are merely 
consistent with a defendant’s liability fall short of being 
facially plausible.”  Chaparro v. Carnival Corp., 693 F.3d 1333, 
1337 (11th Cir. 2012)(citations omitted).  Thus, the Court engages 
in a two-step approach: “When there are well-pleaded factual 
allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then 
determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to 
relief.”  Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. 
“Generally, the existence of an affirmative defense will not 
support a motion to dismiss,” Quiller v. Barclays Am./Credit, Inc., 
727 F.2d 1067, 1069 (11th Cir. 1984), aff’d on reh'g, 764 F.2d 
1400 (11th Cir. 1985) (en banc) (per curiam) (reinstating panel 
opinion), because plaintiffs are not required to negate an 
affirmative defense in their complaint.  La Grasta v. First Union 
Sec., Inc., 358 F.3d 840, 845 (11th Cir. 2004).  A complaint may 
be dismissed, however, when the existence of an affirmative defense 
“clearly appears on the face of the complaint.”  Quiller, 727 F.2d 
at 1069.  “A complaint may be dismissed if an affirmative defense, 
such as failure to exhaust, appears on the face of the complaint.  
Otherwise, exhaustion and other affirmative defenses must be 
raised in a responsive pleading.”  Bingham v. Thomas, 654 F.3d 
1171, 1175 (11th Cir. 2011) (citations omitted).  See also La 
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Grasta, 358 F.3d at 845 (“[A] Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal on statute 
of limitations grounds is appropriate only if it is ‘apparent from 
the face of the complaint’ that the claim is time-barred”) (quoting 
Omar ex rel. Cannon v. Lindsey, 334 F.3d 1246, 1251 (11th Cir. 
2003)); Douglas v. Yates, 535 F.3d 1316, 1321 (11th Cir. 
2008)(same). 
III. 
 All four counts of the Second Amended Complaint are based 
upon the same facts.  In short, plaintiff alleges that on September 
19, 2014, Google removed 231 of its websites from being displayed 
on Google or Google-affiliated websites because they had been 
identified as “pure spam.”  Over time, 365 such websites were 
removed.  As a result of these removals, plaintiff’s websites could 
not be located by anyone using the Google.com search engine.  
Plaintiff attempted to cause new websites to be listed in Google’s 
search results, but these new websites were rejected by Google 
because of their affiliation with plaintiff.  Plaintiff alleges 
that the removal of its websites was inconsistent with statements 
published by Google in its “Removal Policies,” both in terms of 
what the Policy says and what it fails to say.  Plaintiff alleges 
that Google’s public statements about its removal policy were 
false, deceptive, and misleading because they are inconsistent 
with what Google did to plaintiff, and identifies eight specific 
false statements.  Plaintiff alleges that Google’s conduct towards 
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it was motivated by anti-competitive reasons and to punish 
plaintiff for engaging in “pure spam” and not on the content of 
the websites.  
A. Communications Decency Act Defense 
Defendant first asserts that all of plaintiff’s claims are 
barred by the Communications Decency Act (the “CDA”).  (Doc. #78, 
pp. 7-10.)  Pursuant to the CDA, “[n]o provider or user of an 
interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or 
speaker of any information provided by another information content 
provider.”  47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1).  The purpose of the CDA is to 
establish “federal immunity to any cause of action that would make 
service providers liable for information originating with a third-
party user of the service.”  Almeida v. Amazon.com, Inc., 456 F.3d 
1316, 1321 (11th Cir. 2006) (citations omitted).  Accordingly, the 
CDA provides immunity for “any action[s] voluntarily taken in good 
faith to restrict access to or availability of material that the 
provider or user considers to be obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, 
excessively violent, harassing, or otherwise objectionable . . . 
.” 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2) (emphasis added).  While the majority of 
federal circuits have held that such immunity is “broad,” the 
statutory immunity provided for under the CDA “does not apply 
without limitation.”  Almeida, 456 F.3d at 1321-22 (citing 47 
U.S.C. § 230(e)(1)). 
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It is not disputed that Google is, as courts across the 
country have agreed, a provider of an interactive computer service. 
Dowbenko v. Google Inc., 582 F. App’x 801, 805 (11th Cir. 2014); 
Langdon v. Google, Inc., 474 F. Supp. 2d 622, 630 (D. Del. 2007); 
Parker v. Google, Inc., 422 F. Supp. 2d 492, 501 (E.D. Pa. 2006); 
Novak v. Overture Servs., 309 F. Supp. 2d 446, 452 (E.D.N.Y. 2004).  
As such, plaintiff’s claims against Google are subject to the CDA.   
The CDA statutory immunity is an affirmative defense which 
plaintiff is not required to negate in its Complaint.  The plain 
language of the CDA only provides immunity for actions “voluntarily 
taken in good faith.”  47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2)(A).  While the CDA 
defense may properly be considered if it is apparent from the face 
of the complaint, that is not the situation in this case.  Here, 
plaintiff has included allegations within its Second Amended 
Complaint that Google failed to act in good faith when removing 
its websites from Google’s search results.  (Doc. #75, ¶¶ 18, 54, 
57-62, 68; Doc. #79, pp. 9-10.) Compare Smith v. Trusted Universal 
Standards in Elec. Transactions, Inc., No. 09-4567(RBK/KMW), 2010 
WL 1799456, at *7 (D.N.J. May 4, 2010) (declining to dismiss due 
to allegation of lack of good faith in complaint), with 
E360insight, LLC v. Comcast Corp., 546 F. Supp. 2d 605, 609-10 
(N.D. Ill. 2008) (dismissing claims based on CDA where “the absence 
of good faith is not adequately plead”).  Viewing the Second 
Amended Complaint’s allegations in the light most favorable to the 
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plaintiff, the Court denies Google’s Motion to Dismiss on the basis 
of the CDA.3 
B. First Amendment Defense 
Defendant next asserts that plaintiff’s claims are barred by 
the First Amendment because Google’s search results are 
constitutionally protected opinions, and the First Amendment 
protects Google from liability based on its removal of plaintiff’s 
websites from its search results.  (Doc. #78, pp. 10-13.)  
Plaintiff responds that Google’s actions are not entitled to 
protection by the First Amendment because they did not involve 
content-based speech and, if speech was involved, it was 
unprotected misleading commercial speech.  (Doc. #79, pp. 10-15.)  
“[T]he First Amendment guarantees ‘freedom of speech,’ a term 
necessarily comprising the decision of both what to say and what 
not to say.”  Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind of N.C., Inc., 487 
U.S. 781, 796-97 (1988).  It is well established that First 
Amendment protection applies not only to individuals, but also to 
corporations and other associations.  Pac. Gas and Elec. Co. v. 
Pub. Utils. Comm’n of Cal., 475 U.S. 1, 8 (1986).  The First 
3 Google cites to Donato v. Moldow, 865 A.2d 711, 727-28 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. 2005) to support its argument that plaintiff has not 
adequately alleged lack of good faith on behalf of Google.  The 
Court has reviewed the case and finds that plaintiff has more 
plausibly alleged lack of good faith than that alleged in Donato. 
Id.  The Court believes the allegations within plaintiff’s Second 
Amended Complaint are sufficient at this stage of the proceedings.   
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Amendment “can serve as a defense in state tort suits,” Snyder v. 
Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 451 (2011) (citing Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. 
Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 50-51 (1988)), and limits “the type of speech 
that may be the subject of state defamation actions.”  Milkovich 
v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 16 (1990) (emphasis omitted).  
See also Jefferson Cnty. Sch. Dist. No. R-1 v. Moody’s Inv’r’s 
Servs., Inc., 175 F.3d 848, 857-58 (10th Cir. 1999) (finding 
protected speech cannot serve as the basis for a claim of tortious 
interference with contractual relationships because the protected 
speech is per se lawful).   
The Court has little quarrel with the cases cited by Google 
for the proposition that search engine output results are protected 
by the First Amendment.  Zhang v. Baidu.com Inc., 10 F. Supp. 3d 
433 (S.D.N.Y. 2014); Langdon, 474 F. Supp. 2d 622; Kinderstart v. 
Google, Inc., No. C06-2057JF(RS), 2007 WL 831806, at *1 (N.D. Cal. 
Mar. 16, 2007); Search King, Inc. v. Google Tech., Inc., No. CIV-
02-1457-M, 2003 WL 21464568, at *1 (W.D. Okla. May 27, 2003).  The 
Court finds these cases persuasive that Google’s PageRanks are 
pure opinions of the website’s relevancy to a user’s search query, 
incapable of being proven true or false.  While a claim based upon 
Google’s PageRanks or order of websites on Google’s search results 
may be barred by the First Amendment, plaintiff has not based its 
claims on the PageRanks or order assigned to its websites.  Rather, 
plaintiff is alleging that as a result of its pages being removed 
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from Google’s search results, Google falsely stated that e-
ventures’ websites failed to comply with Google’s policies.  (Doc. 
#75, ¶¶ 66, 88-89, 92.)  Google is in fact defending on the basis 
that e-ventures’ websites were removed due to e-ventures’ failure 
to comply with Google’s policies.  (Doc. #78.)  The Court finds 
that this speech is capable of being proven true or false since 
one can determine whether e-ventures did in fact violate Google’s 
policies.  This makes this case distinguishable from the PageRanks 
situation.  Therefore, this case does not involve protected pure 
opinion speech, and the First Amendment does not bar the claims as 
pled in the Second Amended Complaint. 
Google also argues that its search results are editorial 
judgments protected by the First Amendment.  (Id. at 13.)  While 
publishers are entitled to discretion for editorial judgment 
decisions, plaintiff has alleged that Google’s reason for banning 
its websites was not based upon “editorial judgments,” but instead 
based upon anti-competitive motives.  (Doc. #75, ¶ 18; Doc. #79, 
p. 11); Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm’n on Human 
Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 386 (1973); Ragin v. New York Times Co., 
923 F.2d 995, 1003 (2d Cir. 1991); Levitch v. Columbia Broad. Sys., 
Inc., 495 F. Supp. 649, 662 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (“[A]bsent such purely 
editorial conduct, plaintiffs’ claims must be tested against the 
normal pleading requirements applicable in federal court.”).  
Further, a fact published maliciously with knowledge of its falsity 
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or serious doubts as to its truth is sufficient to overcome the 
editorial judgment protection afforded by the Constitution.  
Pittsburgh Press Co., 413 U.S. at 386.   
Plaintiff has adequately alleged that it did not violate any 
of Google’s policies and that the representations made by Google 
that e-ventures’ pages violate Google’s policies are false.  
Whether or not plaintiff can support these assertions and carry 
its burden at a later stage of the proceedings is for a different 
day.  The Court finds that at this stage of the proceedings, the 
Second Amended Complaint is sufficient to withstand Google’s First 
Amendment arguments.4  
C. Pleading Sufficiency of Count I:  Unfair Competition Under 
the Lanham Act  
 
In Count I, plaintiff alleges that Google violated a portion 
of § 43(a) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a).  The Lanham Act 
provides in pertinent part that: 
(1) Any person who, on or in connection with any goods 
or services, or any container for goods, uses in commerce 
any word, term, name, symbol, or device, or any 
combination thereof, or any false designation of origin, 
false or misleading description of fact, or false or 
misleading representation of fact, which-- 
 
(A) is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, 
or to deceive as to the affiliation, connection, or 
4 Because Google is only arguing that its search results are 
protected pure opinions and it is entitled to protection for 
editorial judgments, the Court need not address plaintiff’s 
arguments that Google’s speech is content-based and unprotected 
commercial speech.   
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association of such person with another person, or as to 
the origin, sponsorship, or approval of his or her goods, 
services, or commercial activities by another person, or 
 
(B) in commercial advertising or promotion, 
misrepresents the nature, characteristics, qualities, or 
geographic origin of his or her or another person's 
goods, services, or commercial activities, 
 
shall be liable in a civil action by any person who 
believes that he or she is or is likely to be damaged by 
such act. 
 
15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1).   
 Count I alleges that Google violated the following portion of 
the statute:  “Any person who, on or in connection with any goods 
or services . . . uses in commerce any  . . . false or misleading 
description of fact, or false or misleading representation of fact 
which . . . is likely to deceive as to . . . commercial activities 
by another person . . . shall be liable . . . .”  (Doc. #75, ¶ 
64.)  Specifically, plaintiff alleges that:  
Google’s description of its search engine services in 
the Removal Policies, and other statements identified in 
Paragraph 47 . . . were false or misleading to consumers 
and likely to deceive consumers . . . into believing 
that [plaintiff’s] websites had violated Google’s 
Removal Policies (or other published policies) and that 
is why the websites were banned from Google’s search 
results, when this was not the case. 
 
(Id. ¶¶ 65-66.)  Plaintiff alleges that this was unfair treatment 
which resulted in damages.  (Id. ¶¶ 67-71.)   
 Google moves to dismiss Count I of plaintiff’s Second Amended 
Complaint because plaintiff failed to (1) identify any statement 
made “in commercial advertisement or production,” (2) allege that 
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the statements were material to consumers’ purchasing decisions, 
and (3) allege that plaintiff suffered injury directly from 
defendant’s advertising.  (Doc. #78, pp. 13-15.)   
“The Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a), sets forth two distinct 
claims of unfair trade practices: unfair competition under 
subsection 1125(a)(1)(A) and false advertising under subsection 
1125(a)(1)(B).”  Synergy Real Estate of SW Fla., Inc. v. Premier 
Prop. Mgmt. of SW Fla., LLC, 578 F. App’x 959, 961 (11th Cir. 
2014).  Count I does not allege a cause of action for false 
advertising; rather, the Count only quotes from § 1125(a)(1)(A), 
which provides a cause of action for unfair competition, which in 
this case is based on allegedly false representations.  Therefore, 
while Google is correct that Count I fails to identify any 
statement made “in commercial advertisement or production” and 
fails to allege that plaintiff suffered injury directly from 
defendant’s advertising, such deficiencies are not relevant to the 
claim asserted.  The other arguments asserted by Google as a basis 
for dismissing plaintiff’s Lanham Act claim are also aimed at a 
claim for false advertising under § 1125(a)(1)(B).  Because 
plaintiff has not alleged a claim for false advertising, the Court 
need not address these arguments.  Accordingly, defendant’s Motion 
to Dismiss Count I is denied.   
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D. Sufficiency of Count II:  Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade 
Practices Act (“FDUPTA”)  
 
Count II alleges a violation of the Florida Deceptive and 
Unfair Trade Practices Act.  Plaintiff alleges that Google’s 
deceptive and misleading statements caused it harm (Doc. #75, ¶ 
76) and have and are likely to deceive consumers, (id. at ¶¶ 77-
80).  Google moves to dismiss plaintiff’s FDUPTA claim for lack of 
standing because e-ventures is not a consumer of Google’s services 
and for failure to state a FDUPTA claim.  (Doc. #78, pp. 15-17.)   
In 2001, the Florida legislature amended the FDUPTA statute, 
replacing “consumer” with “person.”  Fla. Stat. § 501.211.  
Following the amendment, courts have been split as to whether an 
individual or entity must be a “consumer” in order to bring a 
FDUPTA claim.  See Caribbean Cruise Line, Inc. v. Better Bureau of 
Palm Beach Cnty., Inc., 169 So. 3d 164, 168-69 (Fla. 4th DCA 2015) 
(comparing cases).  The predominant trend is to interpret the 
amendment as the legislature’s intent to broaden the scope of 
FDUPTA, allowing any person or entity that has suffered a loss as 
a result of unfair or deceptive acts or practices to sue for 
damages, whether or not a “consumer.”  Id.;  N. Am. Clearing, Inc. 
v. Brokerage Comput. Sys., Inc., 666 F. Supp. 2d 1299, 1310 n.9 
(M.D. Fla. 2009);  Furmanite Am., Inc. v. T.D. Williamson, Inc., 
506 F. Supp. 2d 1134, 1146 (M.D. Fla. 2007) (“This amendment 
demonstrates a clear legislative intent to allow a broader base of 
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complainants who have been injured by violations of FDUTPA to seek 
damages, not just injunctive relief.”); Advanced Prot. Techs., 
Inc. v. Square D Co., 390 F. Supp. 2d 1155, 1164 (M.D. Fla. 2005);  
Intercoastal Realty, Inc. v. Tracy, 706 F. Supp. 2d 1325, 1335 
(S.D. Fla. 2010) (noting that the amendment “clarifies that 
remedies available to individuals are also available to 
businesses.”).  Additionally, a few courts have found that 
regardless of whether an individual non-consumer has standing 
under FDUPTA, a legitimate business enterprise non-consumer does.  
Akzo Nobel Coatings, Inc. v. Auto Paint & Supply of Lakeland, Inc., 
No. 8:09-cv-2453-T-30TBM, 2011 WL 5597364, at *3 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 
17, 2011); Intercoastal Realty, Inc., 706 F. Supp. 2d at 1335.  
Accordingly, the Court finds that e-ventures has standing to sue 
under FDUPTA.   
Google next argues that e-ventures has failed to plausibly 
allege that Google’s actions were deceptive or unfair.  (Doc. #78, 
pp. 17-21.)  Google asserts that e-ventures cannot plausibly allege 
deception or unfair practices based upon the statements that it 
hand-picked from Google’s website because there are additional 
anti-manipulation guidelines on the website that defeat any such 
deception or unfair practices allegations.  (Id.)  Specifically, 
Google points to the fact that it clearly states on its website 
that it will remove a website if the website attempts to manipulate 
its listing in Google’s search results or PageRank.  (Id.)   
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In order to state a claim under FDUPTA, a plaintiff must 
allege a deceptive act or unfair practice, causation, and actual 
damages.  Rollins, Inc. v. Butland, 951 So. 2d 860, 869 (Fla. 2d 
DCA 2006).  A deceptive act may be found when there is a 
“representation, omission, or practice that is likely to mislead 
the consumer acting reasonably in the circumstances, to the 
consumer’s detriment.”  PNR, Inc. v. Beacon Prop. Mgmt., Inc., 842 
So. 2d 773, 777 (Fla. 2003) (citation omitted).  Further, an 
“unfair practice is one that offends established public policy and 
one that is immoral, unethical, oppressive, unscrupulous or 
substantially injurious to consumers.”  Id. (citations omitted).   
Here, plaintiff has alleged the Google removed its websites 
from its search results for anticompetitive and punitive reasons.  
(Doc. #75, ¶¶ 72, 76, 81-82.)  Google disagrees with these 
allegations, but at this stage of the proceedings these allegations 
are sufficient to allege deceptive acts or unfair practices under 
FDUPTA. 
Lastly, Google argues that plaintiff has failed to allege 
causation.  The Court finds plaintiff’s allegations regarding 
causation sufficient at this stage of the proceedings. (Id. ¶¶ 74, 
76, 78, 84.)  Accordingly, defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Count II 
is denied.  
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E. Sufficiency of Count III:  Defamation 
Google argues that plaintiff fails to state a claim for 
defamation because plaintiff has not identified a published 
statement by Google about e-ventures, any statement that Google 
made was not defamatory as a matter of law, and plaintiff has 
failed to plead fault.  (Doc. #78, pp. 20-22.)  Plaintiff responds 
that Google is focusing on the wrong message, and the proper focus 
is the message that Google gave when it delisted e-ventures’ 
websites, which is not an opinion.  (Doc. #79, pp. 18-19.)  
Under Florida law, to state a claim for defamation, plaintiff 
must allege:  “(1) publication; (2) falsity; (3) actor must act 
with knowledge or reckless disregard as to the falsity on a matter 
concerning a public official, or at least negligently on a matter 
concerning a private person; (4) actual damages; and (5) statement 
must be defamatory.”  Jews for Jesus, Inc. v. Rapp, 997 So. 2d 
1098, 1106 (Fla. 2008) (citing Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 
558B, 580A–580B (Am. Law Inst. 1977)).  “[D]efamation . . . 
recognizes the concept that literally true statements can be 
defamatory where they create a false impression.”  Id.  This is 
commonly referred to as defamation by implication.  Id.  
Google first alleges that plaintiff has not identified any 
published statements by Google about e-ventures and has not 
established how the exclusion of links to e-ventures’ sites can be 
a publication about e-ventures.  (Doc. #78, pp. 21-23.)  E-ventures 
23 
 
bases its defamation claim upon what is implied from Google’s 
search results.  Plaintiff has alleged that Google’s statements 
regarding its search results and its actual search results are 
publications made to the public.  (Doc. #75, ¶ 87.)  Plaintiff 
also alleges that removal of its websites from Google’s search 
results falsely indicated to the public that e-ventures’ websites 
met Google’s criteria for removal when that was not true.  (Id. ¶ 
88.)  These allegations are sufficient. 
Second, Google asserts that any statements made by Google are 
not defamatory as a matter of law based upon the First Amendment.  
(Doc. #78, p. 22.)  As addressed supra, the Court finds that the 
allegations of the Second Amended Complaint are sufficient to 
preclude dismissal based upon the anticipated First Amendment 
defense.  
Lastly, Google argues that plaintiff “does not even try to 
plead fault.”  (Id. at 23.)  E-ventures responds that negligence 
is implied because Google acted without reviewing all of e-ventures 
websites prior to removing them.  (Doc. #79, p. 19.)  The Court 
finds that plaintiff’s allegation that Google removed e-ventures’ 
websites without reviewing all of the websites, without more, is 
insufficient to plead fault for a claim of defamation.   
Accordingly, plaintiff’s defamation claim is dismissed 
without prejudice.  
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F. Sufficiency of Count IV:  Tortious Interference  
Google moves to dismiss plaintiff’s claim for tortious 
interference with business relationships because (1) it is 
prohibited by the “single publication/single action rule” and (2) 
Google’s search results are constitutionally protected opinions 
that cannot form the basis of a claim of tortious interference 
with business relationships.  (Doc. #78, pp. 23-26.) 
Under Florida law, to state a claim for tortious interference 
with business relationships, a plaintiff must allege:  “(1) the 
existence of a business relationship . . . (2) knowledge of the 
relationship on the part of the defendant; (3) an intentional and 
unjustified interference with the relationship by the defendant; 
and (4) damage to the plaintiff as a result of the breach of the 
relationship.”  Gossard v. Adia Servs. Inc., 723 So. 2d 182, 184 
(Fla. 1998) (omission in original) (quoting Tamiami Trail Tours, 
Inc. v. Cotton, 463 So. 2d 1126, 1127 (Fla. 1985)).  
First Google argues that the single publication/single action 
rule prevents e-ventures from circumventing “Google’s First 
Amendment and other defenses by stating [a defamation claim] in a 
different guise.”  (Doc. #78, p. 23.)  The single 
publication/single action rule precludes “multiple actions to be 
maintained when they arise from the same publication upon which a 
failed defamation claim is based.”  Ovadia v. Bloom, 756 So. 2d 
137, 141 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000); Callaway Land & Cattle Co. v. Banyon 
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Lakes C. Corp., 831 So. 2d 204, 208 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002) (“In 
Florida, a single publication gives rise to a single cause of 
action.  The various injuries resulting from it are merely items 
of damage arising from the same wrong.” (citation omitted)).  
Accordingly, a single publication can only give rise to a single 
cause of action.  Id.  “The rule is designed to prevent plaintiffs 
from circumventing a valid defense to defamation by recasting 
essentially the same facts into several causes of action all meant 
to compensate for the same harm.”  Gannett Co. v. Anderson, 947 
So. 2d 1, 13 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006).   
While the Court agrees with defendant that plaintiff may not 
maintain multiple causes of action premised upon a single 
publication, the Court finds it premature to dismiss plaintiff’s 
claim for tortious interference with business relations based upon 
Florida’s single publication/single action rule.  The Court has 
dismissed plaintiff’s defamation claim without prejudice.  As 
such, plaintiff may or may not choose to seek to amend and re-
assert its defamation cause of action.   
Google also argues that plaintiff has failed to plead the 
elements of a claim for tortious interference with contractual 
business relationships because Google’s search results are 
constitutionally protected opinions, therefore they cannot be 
considered wrongful, and because plaintiff has failed to 
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adequately allege that Google wrongfully or intentionally harmed 
e-ventures’ business relationships.  (Doc. #78, pp. 24-25.)  
As discussed previously, while the Court does agree that 
Google’s search results can constitute speech and opinions as to 
the relevance of the search results to a search query, that is not 
what plaintiff’s tortious interference claim is premised upon.  
Plaintiff’s tortious interference claim alleges interference due 
to Google’s removal of the websites, not necessarily what was 
communicated by its search results.  (Doc. #75, ¶¶ 97-100.)  
Accordingly, the Court holds that plaintiff’s tortious 
interference claim is based upon Google’s action of banning e-
ventures’ websites, and not on what was communicated by the ban, 
therefore the claim does not fail on the basis that it is based 
upon protected pure opinions.  As discussed supra, the Court finds 
that plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint contains allegations 
sufficient to overcome Google’s defense that its actions were 
protected editorial decisions—namely that Google’s actions were 
based upon anti-competitive, punitive reasons.  Lastly, plaintiff 
has alleged that “Google’s conduct was not privileged, justified 
or excusable.”  (Id. ¶ 102.)   
Google next argues that plaintiff has failed to allege that 
Google wrongfully and intentionally harmed its business 
relationships.  (Doc. #78, pp. 24-25.)  The Court disagrees.  (See 
Doc. #75, ¶ 98.)  Contrary to Google’s assertion that plaintiff 
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has failed to allege facts that Google knew about e-ventures’ 
business relationships, plaintiff has alleged that “Google was . 
. . aware of e-ventures’ contractual relationships with third 
parties during the ban, because e-ventures and its counsel sent 
Google letters detailing the damage prior to filing suit.”  (Id. 
¶ 101.)   
Accordingly, the Court denies Google’s Motion to Dismiss 
Count IV of plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint.  
Accordingly, it is now  
ORDERED: 
1. Defendant Google's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Second 
Amended Complaint and Supporting Memorandum of Law (Doc. #78) is 
GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.  Google’s Motion to Dismiss 
Count III is granted without prejudice; the Motion to Dismiss is 
otherwise denied.   
2. Defendant shall file a responsive pleading to 
plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint within FOURTEEN (14) DAYS of 
this Opinion and Order.   
DONE AND ORDERED at Fort Myers, Florida, this __12th__ day of 
May, 2016. 
 
 
Copies:  Counsel of record 
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